ABSTRACT A quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocol based on the hyper-entangled state is proposed to improve the efficiency of eavesdropping detection in an improved ''ping-pong'' protocol, in which we use the hyper-entangled state to detect eavesdropping during the quantum communication. In the security analysis, we use the entropy theory method to calculate the amount of information and compare the detection strategy of two QSDC protocols quantitatively by comparing the constraint between the maximal amount of information that the eavesdropper can get, and the probability that the eavesdropper is detected. The probability of being detected will be 50% in the original QSDC protocol which based on the Bell states if the eavesdropper attempts to get all the information, however, in the proposed protocol this probability can reach 75%, which indicates that the proposed protocol is more secure.
I. INTRODUCTION
How to prevent the secret messages from being leaked to an illegitimate user is a very important issue today. In 1926, the One-time pad (OTP) scheme was presented by Vernam [1] , and it was proved perfectly secure by Shannon in 1949 [2] . However, how to securely distribute secret keys through classical channel is a tricky problem, which greatly limits the promotion and application of OTP. The development and application of modern quantum mechanics provides a new idea and tool for communication security. The quantum key distribution (QKD), which enables the two parties generate and share a random and secure key to encrypt and decrypt messages, is the only proven protocol for secure key distribution [3] - [6] .
In 1984 Bennett and Brassard proposed the first QKD protocol, which was called BB84 protocol now. After that, great progress has been made in the field of quantum information security processing, for example, quantum dense
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coding [7] , [8] , quantum teleportation [9] - [14] , quantum secret sharing [15] , [16] , and some other recent research on quantum information [17] - [24] . Later in 2002, Boström and Felbinger presented a deterministic QKD protocol (''pingpong'' protocol) [25] , which greatly promoted the development of quantum communication security. The ''ping-pong'' protocol is not only a QKD protocol whose task is establishing random and common keys between two remote parties, but also a QSDC(quantum secure direct communication) protocol whose object is sending secret messages directly.
Compared with QKD, QSDC transmits the secure messages directly via quantum channel without establishing a random key to encrypt them first. QSDC should satisfy two requirements: First, when the legitimate user Bob receives the quantum states, he can read out the secure messages directly, and there is no need the additional classic information after the transmission of particles, which requires QSDC to have a more efficient eavesdropping detection system to ensure the security of the channel, so as to detect the eavesdroppers in time and ensure that the secret messages can be transmitted securely. Second, even if the eavesdropper may get hold of the channel, the secret messages that have been encoded in quantum states should not be leaked, that is to say, the eavesdropper not only can be detected, but also gets blind results, which also requires QSDC to have higher security requirements for the channel to prevent the secret messages from being leaked out. Although QSDC is difficult to implement now, it is an important direction for the future development of quantum communication. QSDC has aroused people's great research interests and a lot of similar protocols have been presented, such as the two-way QSDC protocols [26] - [35] , protocols using entanglement [36] - [42] , protocols without using entanglement [43] - [45] and so on.
Since the ''ping-pong'' protocol was proposed, many researchers have found much vulnerability in it. First, it is possible that some of the messages may be leaked, especially in quantum channels with noise. Second, the ''ping-pong'' protocol's capacity is restricted, and one entangled state carries only one bit of classical information. To overcome these problems, Deng et al. proposed an improved ''pingpong'' protocol which called ''two-step quantum direct communication'' scheme in 2003 [36] . In Deng's scheme, the entangled particle pairs are divided into two sequences: one is checking sequence for checking Eve's eavesdropping behavior, the other is message-coding sequence for transmitting secure messages. However, the efficiency of eavesdropping detection about this scheme is low.
According to the idea presented in [36] , we propose an improved protocol which based on hyper-entangled state in this paper to increase the efficiency of eavesdropping detection, in our protocol we use the hyper-entangled state particles to detect eavesdropping. For simplicity, we refer to the original protocol in [36] as EPP, and refer to our protocol based on the hyper-entangled state as TPP. In the security analysis, we use the entropy theory method to calculate the amount of information, and compare the detection strategy of EPP and TPP quantitatively through contrasting the constraint between the maximal amount of information eavesdropper Eve can get, and the probability that the eavesdropper is detected. We have proved that if Eve attempts to get all information, in EPP the rate of eavesdropping detection will be 50%, however, in TPP this detection rate can reach 75%. At last, the security of TPP is discussed, the analysis results show that the TPP is more secure than EPP.
II. THE EPP PROTOCOL
The four Bell states are as follows:
Suppose Alice and Bob negotiate that the four Bell states |ψ − , |ψ + , |ϕ − and |ϕ + represent the classical bits 11, 01, 10, and 00 respectively. If measure a single photon's state of an EPR pair particles, the state of the EPR pair will collapse and the rest particle's state can be determined once we get the first photon's state. However, if we can only get one particle of the EPR pair, then we will not be able to determine the Bell state in which the particle was previously located. The process of EPP protocol is as follows:
(1) Alice prepares N ordered EPR pairs that in state
). Alice uses all these EPR pairs' first particles to form sequence A in order, and the rest particles of these EPR pairs form sequence B in order. sequence A as decoy photons to detect eavesdropping, and performs on them randomly one of the four operations(U 0 , U 1 , U 2 and U 3 ). It should be noted that only Alice knows the positions of these decoy photons and the operations performed on them. Alice keeps these information secret until the communication is completed. The remaining particles of sequence A are used to carry the secret messages that Alice wants to send to Bob. Alice must encode her messages on the remaining particles before the transmission, explicitly, Alice performs four unitary operations(U 0 , U 1 , U 2 and U 3 ) to the remaining particles to transform the Bell state |ψ − into |ψ − , |ψ + , |ϕ − and |ϕ + respectively, which correspond to classical bits 11, 01, 10, 00 respectively. The four unitary operations are as follows: 
III. THE TPP PROTOCOL A. THE HYPER-ENTANGLED STATE
The hyper-entangled state is the quantum state that pairs of photons are entangled simultaneously in multiple degrees of freedom [46] . In TPP protocol, the hyper-entangled state that two particles are entangled simultaneously in both spatial (path) and polarization degrees of freedom is used to detect eavesdroppers during the quantum communication. The Bell bases for the degrees of freedom in spatial and polarization can be written as: 2)(|01 − |10 ). He uses all these EPR pairs' first particles to form sequence A in order, and the rest particles of these EPR pairs form the sequence B in order. The qubits in sequence A is called travel qubits for short, and the qubits in sequence B is called home qubits.
(2) Bob prepares a enough number cN / (1 − c) of hyperentangled state | + ps and forms the checking sequence C as decoy photons to detect eavesdroppers. Here, c is the probability of control mode in original ''ping-pong'' protocol(In original ''ping-pong'' protocol, the authors introduced two communication modes, ''message mode'' and ''control mode''. By default, Alice and Bob are in message mode and transfer secret messages. With probability c, Alice and Bob switches to control mode to detect eavesdroppers. So we call c is the probability of control mode.) [25] , N is the number of EPR pairs prepared by Bob in step 1. Note that the sequence C includes 2cN / (1 − c) qubits. Bob inserts the checking sequence C(the decoy photons sequence) into the travel qubits sequence A randomly, forming the travel data sequence D. It should be noted that only Bob knows these decoy photons' positions in the travel data sequence D.
(3) Bob keeps the home qubits sequence B and sends Alice the sequence D. Bob performs Bell measurement on the sequences A and B simultaneously to get the secret messages. Otherwise, Alice and Bob abandon this communication and repeat the procedures from the beginning.
(7) Alice and Bob have successfully transmitted 2N classical bits, they repeat step (1) to step (7) until they finish transmitting all the messages.
(8) The TPP protocol ends successfully.
IV. THE TPP PROTOCOL'S SECURITY ANALYSIS
Suppose the probability that Eve can be detected in TPP is d, the maximal amount of the information which Eve can eavesdrop is I (d), in the original ''ping-pong'' protocol the function I (d) has been given [25] :
We will use the function I (d) to compare and analyze the eavesdropping detection efficiency about EPP and TPP.
Let us first analyze the TPP protocol's eavesdropping detection efficiency. Assume that the eavesdropper Eve takes the most common eavesdropping operation. That is to say, if Eve wants to get the information about Alice's operation on the message qubits, she should perform an attack (a unitary operation ∧ E) on the message qubits firstly, after Alice encoding the secret messages on the message qubits, Eve finally takes a measurement on the message qubits [25] . However, as Eve doesn't know we have inserted the decoy photons in the message qubits, so what she only can do is performing the eavesdropping operation on all the message qubits and decoy photons.
Suppose there is a group of decoy photons at the hyperentangled state | + ps , after being attacked by Eve by performing the unitary operation ∧ E, the states |H , |V , |R and |L become |ϕ H =Ê|Hx = α|Hx 0 + β|Vx 1 (15) |ϕ V =Ê|Vx = α |Hx 0 + β |Vx 1 (16) |ϕ R =Ê|Rx = m|Ry 0 + n|Ly 1 (17) |ϕ L =Ê|Lx = m |Ry 0 + n |Ly 1 (18) where |x i , |x i , |y i and |y i (i = 0, 1) are the pure ancillary states that determined by attack operation After attacked by the eavesdropper Eve, the state of the composed system becomes [42] , (19) as shown at the bottom of this page.
When Alice takes an hyper-entangled state measurement on all the decoy photons, obviously only particles with the state | + ps can not be detected. Expand the formula (19) and the probability without eavesdropper is given in (20) , as shown at the top of the next page. So the lower bound of the probability that Eve's eavesdropping being detected in TPP is
Suppose 
Now let us analyze how much information that the eavesdropper Eve can get when there is no control mode. First, let us consider the case that the original photon's quantum state is |0 , after being attacked by Eve with the operation [36] |ϕ =Ê|0 = α|0 | 00 + β|1 | 01 
Then after Alice encoding the message qubits by performing the unitary operations U 0 , U 1 , U 2 and U 3 with the probabilities p 0 , p 1 , p 2 and p 3 (p 0 + p 1 + p 2 + p 3 = 1) respectively, the state reads
which can be rewritten in the orthogonal basis{0, 00 1, 01 1, 00 0, 01 } as (26), as shown at the bottom of this page.
According to the [25] we can get that the amount of information I 0 Eve can eavesdrop is
here λ i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) are the eigenvalues of ρ , and they are
If the four operations U 0 , U 1 , U 2 and U 3 distribute with equal probability, that is, p 0 = p 1 = p 2 = p 3 = 0.25, then λ 0 , λ 1 , λ 2 and λ 3 can simplify to λ 0 = λ 2 = 0.5d, λ 1 = λ 3 = 0.5 (1−d), and then the amount of information I 0 that Eve can eavesdrop can be written as
The above analysis is based on the case that Bob sends
|0
, now let's analyze the case Bob sends |1 . Obviously the security analysis of state |0 can be fully applicable to the state |1 . So the amount of information I 1 that Eve can get when Bob sends |1 is:
Therefore, the total information Eve can eavesdrop is
It's easy to calculate that when a = c = p = s in equation (18), we can get then I can get its maximum, that is
here
However, the maximum amount of the information that Eve can acquire in EPP [36] is given:
In order to compare TPP and EPP protocol's eavesdropping detection efficiency, the function I (d T ) and I (d E ) need to be analyzed and compared. It is easy to calculate that if Eve intends to get all information(that is I = 2), the detection probability's lower bound is d E = 0.5 in EPP, while it is d T = 0.75 in TPP, that is to say, Eve is more easily to be detected in TPP than EPP.
To compare the function I (d T ) and I (d E ) intuitively, we drew them in Figure 3 . It can be inferred from Figure 3 that the probability of eavesdropping detection in TPP is higher than EPP when the eavesdropper Eve intends to acquire the same amount of information, which indicates that TPP has better detection efficiency than EPP, and TPP is more secure than EPP.
Taking the control mode into account, we can get that both the message bits number in each protocol run and a message transfer's probability are 1 − c in the case where the control mode probability is c. Therefore, the probability that Eve attempts to obtain a message transfer and without being detected is [25] :
If eavesdropper Eve intends to get nI (d) bits of information after n successful attacks, this event's probability will be When c and d is given, if Eve wants to acquire the same amount of information, the probability of success in TPP is lower than EPP, which indicates that it is more difficult for Eve to steal information in the TPP protocol, and TPP is more secure than EPP.
s n , so the probability that Eve can successfully get
where
For c > 0, d > 0, when I → ∞ (that is to say, a message is infinitely long) we get s → 0, which indicates that the TPP protocol we present is asymptotically secure. We plot the eavesdropping success probability s and the information I that Eve can steal in Figure 4 in the case where c = 0.5, and d = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, for both EPP and TPP protocol. It can be inferred from Figure 4 that when c and d is given, for example, c = 0.5 and d = 0.1, if Eve wants to acquire the same amount of information, the probability of success in TPP is lower than EPP, which indicates that it is more difficult for Eve to steal information in the TPP protocol, and TPP is more secure than EPP.
Let us give an example for TPP protocol: when the control mode probability is c = 0.5 and the detection probability is d = 0.5, if Eve attempts to get all the information in each attack, that is I (d) = 2, then the probability that Eve can successfully steal 2 character (16 bits) is as low as s ≤ 0.039, which means that this event will almost not happen. In addition, even if Eve gets some bits, she does not know which part they are, and once Eve is detected, Alice and Bob will interrupt the communication and restart a new one, then the random bits in Eve's hand will be meaningless. So, the TPP protocol is proved secure. VOLUME 7, 2019 V. CONCLUSION In summary, a deterministic quantum secure direct communication protocol(TPP) which based on hyper-entangled state has been introduced, we compared it with the original protocol [36] quantitatively by contrasting the constraint between the maximal amount of information Eve gets and the probability that Eve is detected.
Compared with EPP, in TPP protocol, the hyper-entangled state particles are randomly inserted in the travel particles and used as the decoy photons to detect the eavesdropper, and the Bell states particles are used as message sequence to transmit the secret messages. It has been proved that the hyper-entangled state can increase the eavesdropping detection probability. Moreover, in TPP, Eve can only get part of information randomly in the communication, but she even doesn't know which part of information she obtains, so what Eve gets is useless and TPP protocol is proved secure.
In security analysis it has been proved that if Eve attempts to acquire the same amount of information, she is more easily to be detected in TPP than EPP, which indicates that TPP has better detection efficiency than EPP, and TPP is more secure than EPP. However, in our protocol, only the situation that quantum channel without noise is considered, in the further work, a new QSDC protocol in noisy quantum channels will be researched.
